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GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES:
A COMMENTARY
KAYLA MULLEN*
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution promises
that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”1 Long recognized as a fundamental
right in Western legal thought, this bar on subsequent prosecutions for
the same conduct was brought to the United States through English
common law, and is enshrined today in various forms not only in the
Constitution, “but in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every [U.S.]
state, as well as most foreign nations.”2 This right is premised on the
idea that the government should not be able to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual, as recurrent prosecutions “subject[]
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel[] him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhance[] the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”3
Nevertheless, this lofty constitutional promise rings hollow for
those defendants who are prosecuted by both state and federal
authorities for the same offense. Under the judicially created dualsovereignty exception,4 a defendant may be prosecuted by state and
federal governments for the same conduct, due to the fact that the
state and federal government constitute two separate sovereignties.5
The doctrine is grounded in the idea that each sovereign derives its
power from independent sources—the federal government from the
Copyright ©2019 Kayla Mullen.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 153–54 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957).
4. This doctrine is often referred to as either the “separate-sovereigns” or “dualsovereignty” exception or doctrine. This commentary will use both terms interchangeably, as
most literature on the topic does; both refer to the concept that state and federal governments
are separate sovereigns and therefore, may each punish a defendant that has violated both state
and federal laws with the same conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
5. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016).
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Constitution and the states from their inherent police power,
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment—and thus, each
sovereign may determine what constitutes an offense against its peace
and dignity in an exercise of its own sovereignty.6 Under this
exception, defendants, by a single act, may violate the laws of both
sovereigns and therefore be liable to prosecutions by both
governments for the same conduct without their Fifth Amendment
rights being infringed.7
This Commentary will proceed by examining the precedents
behind the current separate-sovereigns doctrine and analyzing the
anachronistic results they have produced. It concludes by arguing that
although the Court will most likely not overrule the dual-sovereignty
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court should examine
how the legal and factual underpinnings of the doctrine have changed
and, ultimately, choose to overrule the exception.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2008, Terance Martez Gamble was convicted of second-degree
robbery in Mobile County, Alabama.8 Second-degree robbery is
classified as a felony offense in Alabama and thus, following his
conviction, Gamble was barred by both state and federal law from
possessing a firearm.9 In 2015, Gamble was driving in Mobile when he
was pulled over by a police officer for a faulty headlight.10 The officer,
upon smelling marijuana, searched Gamble’s vehicle and unearthed
two small bags of marijuana, a digital scale, and a 9-mm handgun.11
The state of Alabama prosecuted Gamble for possessing marijuana
and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under state law; he
was convicted and sentenced to one year in state prison.12
While the state prosecution was pending, the federal government
charged Gamble for the same offense under federal law—being a
felon in possession of a firearm—arising out of “the same incident of
November 29, 2015 that gave rise to his state court conviction.”13
6. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
7. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
9. Id. at 1–2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Gamble moved to dismiss his federal indictment on the grounds that
it violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy,
but the District Court denied his motion, citing the separatesovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.14 Gamble then
entered a conditional guilty plea, “preserving his right to appeal the
court’s denial of his double jeopardy claim,” and was sentenced to
forty-six months in federal prison and three years of supervised
release.15
Gamble appealed the district court’s denial of his double jeopardy
claim to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued a per
curiam opinion, affirming the decision below based on the separatesovereigns exception.16 Gamble then filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court, which the Court granted on June
28, 2018.17
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Fox v. Ohio
Often cited as the first Supreme Court case that addressed the
validity of subsequent prosecutions by state and federal
governments,18 Fox v. Ohio tentatively laid the basis for the dualsovereignty doctrine the Court would later introduce.19 In Fox, the
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that
criminalized passing counterfeited currency,20 asserting that since
Congress had imposed federal criminal sanctions on this conduct, a
failure to find that the Supremacy Clause precluded the states from
punishing the same conduct would subject a defendant to double
punishment.21 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not apply to the states, and thus, even if a defendant could possibly be
subject to double punishment, the federal and state governments

14. Id. at 2–3.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959).
19. See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434 (1847) (“The punishment of a cheat or a
misdemeanour practised within the State, and against those whom she is bound to protect, is
peculiarly and appropriately within her functions and duties, and it is difficult to image an
interference with those duties and functions which would be regular or justifiable.”).
20. Id. at 432–433.
21. Id. at 434.
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retained the power to impose criminal sanctions on the same
conduct.22
B. United States v. Lanza
The Court directly confronted for the first time the question of
whether a prior state conviction barred subsequent federal
prosecution for the same conduct under the Double Jeopardy
Clause23 in United States v. Lanza.24 Respondents had been convicted
in state court of the state crime of manufacturing, transporting, and
possessing liquor, and subsequently were indicted in federal court for
the same act under federal law; they challenged the indictment on the
grounds that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.25 The Court held
double jeopardy did not apply because the state and federal
governments were two separate sovereigns, stating: “Each
government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”26
Because conduct may be denounced by both state and federal
governments as “an offense against the peace and dignity of both,” it
may be punished by each independently without violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Additionally, the Court noted that the Fifth
Amendment only applied to the federal government at the time.27
Therefore, a federal prosecution following a state conviction for the
same conduct did not violate double jeopardy.28
C. Abbate v. United States and Bartkus v. Illinois
The Court decided two double jeopardy cases on the same day in
1959, albeit on different grounds.29 In Abbate v. United States,
petitioners had been convicted under Illinois state law of conspiring
to injure or destroy the property of another and were subsequently
convicted for the same act under federal law in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.30 The
22. Id. at 434–35.
23. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 129 (noting
24. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 378–80 (1922).
25. Id. at 378–79.
26. Id. at 382.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Compare Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (applying the dual-sovereignty
doctrine), with Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (applying Fourteenth Amendment due
process analysis).
30. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188–89 (1959).

MULLEN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES

5/14/2019 11:03 AM

211

petitioners challenged their federal conviction, claiming that they had
been twice placed in jeopardy contrary to the Fifth Amendment,31 and
asked the Court to overrule United States v. Lanza.32 The Court
declined to do so, holding that “the efficiency of federal law
enforcement [would] suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevent[ed] successive state and federal prosecutions.”33
In Bartkus v. Illinois, the petitioner had been acquitted in federal
court for the robbery of a federally insured bank and was
subsequently prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to life
imprisonment in Illinois state court for the same crime and using
substantially the same evidence.34 Due to the fact that the Fifth
Amendment had not yet been incorporated against the states,35
petitioner challenged his state conviction under the Fourteenth
Amendment, asserting that his prior federal acquittal barred
subsequent state prosecution for the same act under the Due Process
Clause.36 The Court stated that holding due process required such a
bar would be “in derogation of our federal system to displace the
reserved power of States over state offenses.”37 Citing both federal
and state precedents as “irrefutable evidence that state and federal
courts have . . . refused to bar a second trial even though there had
been a prior trial by another government for a similar offense,”38 the
Court held that “it would be disregard of a long, unbroken,
unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for [it] now to rule
that due process compels such a bar.”39
D. Benton v. Maryland
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Benton v. Maryland.40 Overruling Palko v. Connecticut,41 the Court
stated that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on being “subject for
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 189.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 121–22 (1959).
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
Id. at 794.
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the same offense to be twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb”42 was
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”43 and therefore,
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.44
E. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle
In Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, the respondents were indicted by
prosecutors for illegally selling firearms in violation of the Puerto
Rico Arms Act of 2000.45 While those charges were pending, a federal
grand jury indicted respondents for the same conduct in violation of
federal gun trafficking laws; both respondents pled guilty to the
federal charges, but moved to dismiss the pending Commonwealth
charges on the grounds that they violated double jeopardy.46 The
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the Commonwealth gun sale
prosecutions violated double jeopardy, as the Commonwealth did not
qualify as a separate sovereign under the exception,47 and the
Supreme Court of the United States agreed.48
To determine if an entity qualifies as a separate sovereign under
the doctrine, the Court examines “whether the prosecutorial powers
of the two jurisdictions have independent origins — or, said
conversely, whether those powers derive from the same ‘ultimate
source.’”49 Therefore, “[i]f an entity’s authority to enact and enforce
criminal law ultimately comes from Congress, then it cannot follow a
federal prosecution with its own.”50 Under this analysis, because
“Congress conferred the authority to create the Puerto Rico
Constitution . . . mak[ing] Congress the original source of power for
Puerto Rico’s prosecutors — as it is for the Federal Government’s,”51
the Court held that Puerto Rico was not a separate sovereign for
purposes of the dual-sovereignty doctrine and therefore, double
jeopardy did apply.52

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 793 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
Id. at 794.
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1870.
Id. at 1867 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1875–76.
Id. at 1876.
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HOLDING
The Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion, upholding the
district court’s ruling that Gamble’s federal prosecution did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.53
Because the state of Alabama and the federal government are
separate sovereigns, the defendant’s prosecution in both state and
federal court for the same conduct—being a felon in possession of a
firearm—did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under the
separate-sovereigns exception.54 As both sovereigns had statutes
banning convicted felons from possessing firearms, the defendant’s
conduct constituted a violation of each law, and thus, the subsequent
prosecutions were not barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause.55
The Court stated, “unless and until the Supreme Court overturns
Abbate, the double jeopardy claim must fail based on the dual
sovereignty doctrine.”56
ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner’s argument centers on two main premises: (1) the
separate-sovereigns exception is unconstitutional and therefore, (2)
stare decisis should not prevent the Court from vindicating the
fundamental constitutional right not to be held twice in jeopardy for
the same offense.57
Regarding the constitutionality of the dual-sovereignty doctrine,
Petitioner argues that the doctrine contravenes the text, original
meaning, and purpose of the Fifth Amendment.58 Petitioner first
argues that the exception violates the plain text of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.59 The clause provides, in unqualified terms, that no
person shall “for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.”60
Petitioner argues that the text of the clause does not contemplate any
exceptions and that the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750–751.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4–9.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 9 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
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Clause supports this.61 The original draft of the clause “prohibited
more than one trial or one punishment for the same offence,”62 and a
member of Congress proposed to add the language “by any law of the
United States,” which “would have permitted the federal government
to prosecute a defendant after a conviction in state court.”63 Congress
rejected this amendment and then chose the current iteration of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, which Petitioner argues shows that the
drafters did not intend for the clause to admit of any exceptions.64
Next, Petitioner contends that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is
in conflict with the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.65
The Clause was modeled off the English common-law rule that barred
subsequent prosecutions and thus, Petitioner argues, to understand
the original scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court must
look to what the English common law was understood to be in 1791.66
“English courts repeatedly held that prosecution in a foreign country
would bar a second prosecution for the same crime in England,”67 if
the first prosecution was in a court of competent jurisdiction.68 Early
American cases also reflect this understanding of the rule.69 Based on
this evidence, Petitioner argues that the dual-sovereignty exception
repudiates the original understanding of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.70
Petitioner also argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine defies
the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.71 The purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect individuals from repeated
attempts by the government to convict them for alleged offenses, curb
governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power, and ensure fairness
and finality for defendants after conviction or acquittal.72 Petitioner
argues that the dual-sovereignty exception does not serve this
purpose: subsequent prosecutions are just as offensive to the
principles of fairness and finality when they are carried out by
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 10.
Id. (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 753 (1789)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
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separate sovereigns as they are when achieved by the same
sovereign.73 Petitioner also argues that the separate sovereigns
exception subverts the “liberty-preserving purpose of federalism;”74
the goal of federalism is to ensure the rights of the people, but when
used to justify the exception, it instead tramples on those rights.75
Thus, because the dual-sovereignty doctrine stands in stark contrast to
the text, original meaning, and purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, Petitioner argues that it should be overruled.76
Therefore, due to the unfairness of the separate-sovereigns
exception, Petitioner argues that the Court should not let stare decisis
prevent it from overruling precedent to vindicate the constitutional
right to not be held twice in jeopardy for the same offense.77 In
choosing to overrule precedent, the Supreme Court usually considers
five factors78: if the precedent had originally developed without any
thorough consideration of the constitutional text, was built on
jurisprudential foundation that has since eroded, was dependent on a
factual background that is no longer existent, has been shown to be
unworkable, and had engendered strong reliance interests that would
be upset.79 Petitioner argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine
arose out of dicta in older opinions that contradicted precedents and
contained incomplete historical analysis, and thus, was wrongly
adopted from the start.80 Petitioner also argues that the doctrine was
constructed around the idea that the Fifth Amendment was not
incorporated against the states—an idea that has since changed and
therefore has eroded the validity of the overarching doctrine, as well.81
Next, Petitioner contends that the rapid federalization of criminal
law has changed the factual underpinnings of the doctrine: federal
criminal law is now much larger than could have ever been foreseen
when the exception was developed.82 Petitioner also argues that the
doctrine has shown itself to be unworkable: the federal government
itself has implemented the “Petite policy” to protect citizens from the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
(1992).
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 42.
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unfairness of subsequent prosecutions.83 The Petite policy “precludes
the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, following a
prior state or federal prosecution based on” the same conduct unless
a substantial federal interest still exists that was not vindicated by the
prior prosecution.84 Petitioner argues that the existence of this policy
demonstrates the government’s acknowledgement of the unfairness of
the dual-sovereignty doctrine.85 Petitioner also argues that no reliance
interests will be upset by overruling the separate-sovereigns
exception, as the doctrine is a procedural one that does not implicate
how private parties have structured their affairs.86 Therefore,
according to Petitioner, the aggregation of all five factors counsels
toward overruling the dual-sovereignty exception to the Double
Jeopardy Clause.87
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent first argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is
imbedded in the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause and thus, the
plain text of the Fifth Amendment supports the existence of a dualsovereignty exception.88 Respondent contends that an “offence [sic]”
under the Double Jeopardy Clause is a violation of a particular law of
a particular sovereign, and therefore, “[a] single act can . . . constitute
multiple ‘offence[s]’” against multiple laws of multiple sovereigns.89
Respondent argues that the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense and an offense does not refer to conduct, but rather to the
“transgression of a law.”90 Thus, Respondent concludes, it follows that
a single action could transgress two laws (state and federal) and
constitute two distinct offences that are both punishable without
violating double jeopardy.91 Respondent argues that double jeopardy
jurisprudence even beyond the separate-sovereigns doctrine has
recognized this: in Grady v. Corbin, the Court attempted to switch to a
conduct-based approach for double jeopardy, but quickly overruled
itself three years later in United States v. Dixon after witnessing the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.031(A) (2018)).
Id. at 46–48.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 32.
Brief for Respondent at 9, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Oct. 25, 2018).
Id.
Id. at 10 (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84 (1985).
Id. at 11.
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unworkability of its approach.92 Thus, Respondent argues, applying
the standard meaning of “offence” to the Double Jeopardy Clause
yields the same results as applying the dual-sovereignty doctrine and
therefore, the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment supports not
overruling the doctrine.93
Respondent also argues that there is no sound reason to overturn
170 years of precedent to overrule the separate-sovereigns
exception.94 Respondent contends that Petitioner’s arguments have all
been considered and rejected in the century and a half that the
doctrine has existed in various cases upholding the exception and that
there exists no new or compelling reason to undermine stare decisis.95
Rather, Respondent argues, overruling the doctrine would create
more injustice than it solves—by asking courts to determine if the
laws of different sovereigns constitute same or different offenses, such
an action would burden the courts and sow more confusion in double
jeopardy jurisprudence.96 Respondent also contends that if the
unfairness created by the separate-sovereigns doctrine is the concern,
the legislative branch, rather than the judicial branch, is best equipped
to alleviate such issues.97 “[A]ny such policy concerns about successive
prosecutions by different sovereigns are best addressed in a more
fine-tuned manner by the political branches,”98 Respondent argues.
Therefore, stare decisis weighs overwhelmingly in favor of not
overruling the separate-sovereigns doctrine, according to Respondent.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court most likely will not overrule the separatesovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Court is
always hesitant to overturn precedent.99 Stare decisis weighs heavily in
favor of continuity in constitutional jurisprudence, and the Court
usually will only overrule itself in extraordinary circumstances.100 The
Court will most likely find that the case at hand does not rise to that
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 44.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 47.
97. Id. at 52.
98. Id.
99. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”).
100. Id. at 854–55.
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level and, therefore, will decline to overrule the dual-sovereignty
doctrine.
The case at hand, however, does raise grave concerns about
fairness in the application of the separate-sovereigns doctrine. The
Fifth Amendment bar on double jeopardy is firmly rooted in the
belief that an individual should not be harassed by multiple trials and
should not be required to deploy the time and expense to defend him
or herself against multiple prosecutions for the same conduct.101 The
prohibition enshrined in the Double Jeopardy Clause is “against
being twice put in jeopardy,” not being punished twice.102 Such equity
concerns are implicated regardless of the prosecutor’s identity, as it is
just as much an outrage “to human dignity and just as dangerous to
human freedom for a man to be punished twice for the same offense,
once by a State and once by the United States, as it would be for one
of these two Governments to throw him in prison twice for the
offense.”103 In each case, an individual is forced to run the gauntlet
twice for the same conduct and the distinction drawn by the Court
between one sovereign prosecuting a defendant twice for the same act
and two sovereigns each prosecuting a defendant once for the same
act feels artificial and formalistic.104 Following the incorporation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment against the states in
Benton v. Maryland,105 this distinction appears even more
anachronistic. Through the separate-sovereigns doctrine, two
sovereigns are able to do together what neither can do on its own,106
in contravention of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.107
While the Court in previous decisions has worried about a “race
to the courthouse” by state and federal authorities if the exception
were overruled,108 the existence of the Petite policy seems to disprove
that view of the dynamic between state and federal prosecutors.109 The

101. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1959).
102. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
103. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“If double
punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two ‘Sovereigns’ to inflict it than for one.”).
105. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
106. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
108. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (“This would bring about a
marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal justice.”).
109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 47.
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policy’s presence depends entirely on cooperation between state and
federal authorities in deciding which sovereign will continue the
criminal prosecution of a defendant who has been charged under both
state and federal laws,110 and there has been no evidence presented
that this dynamic would change if the separate-sovereigns doctrine
were overruled. State and federal authorities could continue to
collaborate in deciding which entity will prosecute the defendant.111
Additionally, in order to proceed with a subsequent federal
prosecution that will follow a state prosecution, the federal
government must obtain a Petite policy approval, showing that a
substantial federal interest exists in the case and will not be vindicated
by the state prosecution.112 But Petite policy approvals are rare: only
around 100 are granted each year.113 The small number of approvals
each year only strengthens the argument that the federal and state
prosecutors cooperate in determining which entity shall go forward
with a prosecution, and demonstrates that it is rare that both state and
federal prosecutions must go forward to vindicate state and federal
interests. Although it may be argued that the Petite policy guards
against double jeopardy,114 using prosecutorial discretion to protect
constitutional rights is thin protection for a right that has been
enshrined as fundamental in the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Gamble v. United States provides the perfect opportunity for the
Supreme Court to overrule the separate-sovereigns exception to the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and eliminate the formalistic distinctions
that allow the state and federal governments to contravene
defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights. In doing so, the Court will
ensure that the promise of the Fifth Amendment rings true for all
defendants, and that federalism is not subverted to allow the state and
federal government to do together what the Constitution bars them
from doing alone.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. argued
Dec. 6, 2018).
114. See id. at 51–52.

